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According to Barry Holman, the Dircctor of Defense
Capabilitics and Managemcnt at the Government Accountability
Office, "Considering changes in thc national security environment
and emerging threats, along with ongoing changes in the United
States defense stratcgy to address these threats and protect our
homeland, DoD has come to real ize the need to reshape its base
strncture to more effectively support its military forces" (Holman,
2005). In other words, the Department of Defense had come up
with a list of837 proposed military base cuts, closures and
realignments to be placed before the 2005 Base Realignment and
Closure (BRAC) Commission for approval. Included in this 2005
BRAC list were a recommended 33 major base closings and 30
major base realignments. The commission estimated that such
closings and realignments would create a savings of 85.5 billion
beginning in the year 2012 (2005). The wave of BRAC changes
were planned in order to "free up funds to better maintain enduring
facilities and meet other needs" (2005). However, while this plan
allows the federal government to save money, the districts
containing the military bases targeted for closure will feel the
negative effects. Once the facilities are shut down, district jobs
associated with the bases will be lost (Atkinson, 1993). According
to Holman, affected communities will also sce community
infrastructure and even environmental impacts from the
discontinued use of the establishments (Holman, 2005).
Based on the notion that Representatives will promote the
interests of their own constituents in Congress, the military-
industrial complex theory states that a Representative from a
district that is more dependent on military spending will be more
likely to support defense spending bills than a Rcpresentative from
a less dependent district (Cobb, 1969 and Cobb, 1976). This
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suggests that, in addition to economic, conununity infrastructure,
and environmental impacts, the BRAC Commission base
realignments and closures may also have a future political impact.
If bases in a district are closed and the district becomes less
dependent on military spending, its Representative may be less
likely to support defense spending legislation.
Past studies examining this theory, completed mainly in the
1970s and 1980s, failed to find any strong evidence that the
relationship predicted by the military-industrial complex exists
(Clotfelter, 1970; Ray, 1981; Cobb 1976, etc), however, such
behavior has been noted in Congress. For example, former
Democratic Representative, Robert Leggett of California, who
strongly favored spending cuts, lobbied for local projects such as
the Mare Island Naval Shipyard and Travis Airforce Base that
would allow defense funds to flow into his district (Ray, 1981).
This study will look to see if such behavior exists today by
updating these past tests using data from the 2000s. More
specifically, this study will explore the relationship between a
district's dependency on military base employment and the
Member's vote on defense appropriations bills for over the past
three fiscal years (FY 2004,2005,2006). Such an analysis can be
used as a very preliminary test of whether there will be political
impacts from the BRAC changes. While a more suitable study
could be performed in the future lIsing actual closure data and
voting records, that data will not be available for several years.
Still, an updated test of the military-industrial complex could give
us a very early warning of the effects to come.
Theory
In explaining the military-industrial complex theory, James
Lindsay stated that "Conventional wisdom holds that constituency
benefits drive congressional voting on defense policy" (Lindsay,
1991). As the Department of Defense dumps more money into a
district in the form of grants, contracts, or employment
opportunities, the members ofthe district benefit. If citizens
benefit from federal spending, it follows that they will be more
likely to support that spending, as will their representatives in
Congress. Because of this phenomenon, "the essential component
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of the military-industrial complex is a high level of defense
spending, which can be authorized and appropriated by the
Congress" (Cobb, 1976). As defensc spending and employment
build up in a district, pressure will be placed on Congressmen and
the Executive branch, by constituents, to continue to spend more
and there will be greater support for aggressive foreign policies
that will lead to increased spending (Cobb, 1969). According to
the thcory, the result of this pressure wi 11 be a group of
Representatives that is more willing to vote for spending and
militant policies in Congress (1969). For all policy and spending
areas, Members of Congress must vote in ways that will support
the "demands, interests, and eeonomic involvements of the
representative's own eonstituents" (Ray, 1981). In other words,
the military-industrial complex is based on a more general "need to
'please thc home-folks'" (1981).
While Members of Congress are usually responsive to the
demands of the main parts of their constituencies and vote based
on their constituencies' characteristics, because they depend on
their Election Day votes, constituents are also dependent on their
Representatives who have the power to vote on policies and
appropriations (Cobb, 1976). When a group of constituencies that
relies on or supports a policy or federal expenditure, develops, a
political force made up of the Representatives from these
constituencies will also form to promote that policy or
appropriation bill (Ray, 1981). On the othcr hand, there will also
be an opposing force made up of those Members of Congress who
represent districts that do not greatly benefit from or depend on
such a policy or spending bili. More speeifically, if Members from
defense spending-dependent districts are strong advocates of
defense appropriations, then Members fi'om districts that are not
dependent on defense spcnding will not be strong advocates of
defense appropriations. Therefore, the military-industrial complex
theOly tells us that there should be a relationship between a
district's dependency on defense spending in the form of grants,
contracts or employment and the Representative's votes on defense
appropriations bi lis.
Past studies approach the test of this hypothesis in various
ways. Stephen Cobb (1969, 1976) examined the military
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employment aspect of defense expenditures. While the data used
is rather outdated, Cobb, in 1969, hypothesized that, "a
Congressman from a district dependent upon a defense industry or
military base will be more likely than his nondependent colleague
to vote for defense appropriations measures because it will be in
his political interest to stimulate the economy of the area he
represents" (Cobb, 1969). Cobb tested this hypothesis by using
two measures - "defense involvement" and "defense dependency"
(1969). While "defense involvement" represented contracts
granted to the district, the "defense dependency" variable
measured dependency as the total number ofjobs generated by
defense spending divided by the total state work force (1969).
However, Cobb found little evidence of a relationship between
dependency and voting behavior and that stronger relationships
exist between a Congressman's voting behavior and his party or
region (1969).
In 1976, Cobb hypothesized that, "A member of the United
States House of Representatives who represents a district
economically dependent on defense spending will be more likely
to vote for. " measures which serve to retain high levels of defense
spending than will his colleagues who represent districts not
dependent upon defense expenditures" (Cobb, 1976). In testing
this hypothesis, Cobb used military and civilian defense payrolls as
a percentage of total income in a district as his independent
variable (1976). He found that, while region and party were the
strongest factors in determining a Member's vote, there was some
evidence of a relationship between these percentages and votes
among the more senior and therefore more powerful
Representatives (1976).
In a more recent effort to find support for the military-
industrial complex theory, James Lindsay (1991) nan-owed down
defense spending issues to a very specific case. He examined the
Strategic Defense Initiative (SOl) and the effects of district
benefits from defense spending on support for "weapons
acquisition" (1991). While Lindsay still found his district benefit
variable to be insignificant, he explained the failure to support the
military-industrial complex theory as a result of weapons issues
being viewed differently than other spending areas (1991).
Res Publica 35
According to his study, "wcapons programs have clear
implications for national security and members feel some
responsibility for promoting the common good" (1991). He goes
on to explain that, although support for weapons programs does
not seem to be influenced by defense spending within a district,
past studies have shown that the military-industrial complex theory
docs hold for other aspects of military spending, such as military
bases (1991).
While previous studies have found only a few cases of
evidence that support the military-industrial complex theory, it is
still possible that a relationship will be found in an updated test.
As Lindsay explained in his conclusion, just because the
hypothesis was not supported in past tests does not mean that it
docs not hold true for other defense spending issues (Lindsay,
1991). Most of the studies performed in the past used data from
the period before the Vietnam War when there was not a strong
opposition to defense spending. Also, district level data were not
available at the time, so the authors of past studies had to create
there own by aggregating county and city level or state and town
level data (Ray, 1981 and Lindsay, 1991). This study will add to
these previous works by narrowing Cobb's (1969) "defense
dependency" variable down to dependency on military base
employment in order to test the hypothcsis that Members of
Congress from districts that are more dependent on military base
employment will be more likely to support military spending bills
than those from less dependent districts.
Model
In order to dctermine the effect of a district's dependency
on military base employment on its member's defense expenditure
voting, a modelmllst be estimated for congressional voting that
includes other constituency characteristics and additional
influences on a Member's vote. This model will use data for thc
House of Representatives and include variables deemed significant
by past literature - party, region, district partisanship, and
membership in a defense related committee.
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The House ofRepresentatives
The House of Representatives will be used in this study
instead of the Senate for several reasons. First of all, there is a
stronger link between constituency opinion and representative
voting behavior in the House (Cobb, 1969). Members ofthe
House are subject to shorter term limits. A Member must pay
close attention to the wants and needs of his constituents if he
expects to get re-elected every two years (1969). In addition, the
.congressional district that comprises a Representative's
constituency is generally smaller and more homogenous than a
state as a whole, which is represented in its entirety by a Senator.
We can see differences in dependency on military base
employment between congressional districts that are within the
same state (Lindsay, 1991). Congressmen were also chosen over
Senators in this study because of the larger role they play in
appropriating funds. Members of the House of Representatives are
more likely to be able to determine where defense spending will go
by placing earmarks in the appropriations bills for specific
expenditures and locations (Cobb, 1969). A final reason for using
the House of Representatives is the sheer size. With the House, we
can look at a sample of 435 cases; the Senate presents only 50
constituencies with 100 Senators. The larger number of districts
allows a greater amount of variation between the cases to appear
(1969).
Voting Model Control Variables
Party
Party must be included as a control variable in the
congressional voting model because of the strong influence it can
have on the way a Congressman votes. Past studies have found
that many Representatives consult party views when determining
how they will vote on certain issues. In a typical year, as many as
two-thirds of votes are "party unity votes," or votes in which a
majority of Republicans oppose a majority of Democrats. As
many as one in ten votes (and probably even more today) result in
90% of one party opposing 90% of the other party (Ornstein, Mann,
& Malbin, 1998). Congressional voting studies have also found
that a legislator will usually vote along party lines in four out of
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every five votes (Davidson & Oleszek, 2000). Patty has come to
play an even stronger role in Congressional voting decisions today
than in the past. The Republican Patty has become more
uniformly conservative sincc Southern conservatives began voting
for Republican candidates. In his research, David W. Rhode
(1992) found that this "decline in archconservative Democrats" has
led to greater cohesion within patties and the way they vote.
Finally, parties promote partisanship in Congress through their
activities. New Member orientation is run by each party,
committee assignme.nts are granted by parties, Members form
partisan "class clubs," and party leadership places pressure on its
Members to vote along party liues (Norpoth, 1976 and Kondracke,
1995). All of these factors combine to make party an important
variable in determining how a Congressman votcs and therefore a
variable that must be controlled for in the model.
Region
With defense issucs especially, region can playa
significant role in how a Member votes. Along with party, Cobb
found region to be the other important factor in determining how a
Congressman will vote on defense spending (Cobb, 1969). The
region that is focused on in this model is the South. We find a
more jingoistic attitude in the South that would promote more
militaristic policies and higher defense spending regardless of the
military spending dependency in the area (Atkinson, 1993 and
Cobb, 1969). The strength of the hawkish attitudes and large
number of military enlistees that comes from the South have even
led some studies to call this region "more military" than any other
(Bachman, 2000). In order to control for the support for military
spending that may come simply from the militaristic attitude of the
South rather than its military base employment dependency, a
"South" (eleven former Confederate States plus Oklahoma)
variable will be included in the model.
District Partisanship
District partisanship or ideology influences how a Member
votes because it plays such a strong role in which candidate gets
elected to Congress. Erikson and Wright (1997) explain that a
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Member can "enhance his or her electoral chances" by
representing the "constituency's prevailing [ideological] view".
Alternatively, if a candidate takes up an extremist ideological
stance, "the constituency can enhance its representation by electing
the opponent" (1997). What this process results in, is "much
higher levels of policy representation than most observers would
expect." Erikson and Wright illustrate this with a high correlation
between a district's vote for President (district partisanship) and its
Member's behavior in roll call votes in Congress (1997). Districts
elect Members whose votes will be influenced by the constituents'
partisanship or ideology. While this effect can be measured in a
variety of ways, this study will use the vote for President Bush in
the 2000 Presidential Election as a determinant of district
partisanship.
Committee Membership
Membership in a defense-related committee must be
included in the voting model because of the power being on one of
these committees can give to a Member. If a Congressman is part
of the Armed Services Committee or the Defense or Military
Construction (now part of Military Quality of Life) Appropriations
Subcommittees, he will playa role in creating defense spending
bills and is more likely to get earmarks in the bills. This means
more defense spending will flow into his district and he will offer
greater support for the bills. The influence committee membership
has on a Member's vote will be controlled for in the model with a
dummy variable that indicates whether or not he is on one of the
committees mentioned above.
While the model includes several control variables that
have been found to influence congressional voting decisions, it
does not contain every possible variable that could influence a
Member's decisions. Davidson and Oleszek noted in their review
that, "Legislative voting models, no matter how elegant, cannot
capture the full range of factors shaping decisions".
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Independent Variable
Originally, the main independent variable, military base
employment dependency, was to be measured as the ratio of
military base employees in a district to the total district work force.
However, district work force data were unavailable. As an
alternative, the dependency is measured by dividing the number of
military base employees in a district by the total population of the
district. The percentages ofthe population over 64 and under 18
will then be included to control for those who have not yet entered
the work force and those who have exited the work force into
retirement. Once this is done, what we have, in essence, is still the
ratio of military base employees to total work force in each district.
It is expected that larger ratios will be positively related to support
for defense spending bills.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in the model measures support for
defense spending bills. Because the study looks to update past
tests of the military industrial complex theory, yet avoid
complications from redistricting, initial House votes on defense
appropriations bills from Fiscal Years 2004 through 2006 will be
used. SUPP0l1 will be determined by a vote for the bill. Not voting
at all expresses no support for the bill and therefore will be
included with those who voted against the spending bill. Putting
the model together, we get the following linear equation:
DeNote = u + 11.(MilEmp) + P2(Party) + JJJ(South) + fI~(DistPartisan) +
fI~(Comm;\'Iclll) + fI(,(Ovcr64) + fl7(Ulldcrl8) + ~l
The data used to run an OLS regression of this equation for
each fiscal year come from Politics in America and the Almanac of
American Politics. Both of these sources produce district level
data so that aggregates do not need to be created from state or
municipal level numbers. Predictions for the signs on each ofthe
regression coefficients are listed in Table 1. The main focus will
be in the "MilEmp" variable and its effect on defense spending
voting.
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DeNote Vote on FY2004-2006 Defense
Aoorooriations Bills (1 =ves O=no)
Independent
Number of military and civilians employed
MilEmp at military bases in the district divided by +
the total oooulation of the district
Party Party of Member from district (O=Dem +1=Rep)
Whether region is in the South or not;
South former Confederate States plus Oklahoma +
(1=South O=all other)
District partisanship as measured by the
DistPart percent Republican vote in the 2000 +
Presidential election
Whether or not Representative from
district is member of Armed Services
CommMem Committee or Defense, MilCon or MilQual +
Appropriations Subcommittee (1=member
O=noO
Over64 Percent of total district population over ?aae 64
Under18 Percent of total district population under ?aqe 18
Results
Looking at the regression results in Table 2, we see that
while the military-industrial complex theory tells us that a
Congressional district's dependency on military base employment
should affect the representative's vote on defense spending bills,
statistics show that it does not.
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Table 2: Unsttlu{/ardhed Regressioll CoeDicie111s for FY2004-2006
((-statistics ill pllreJl1!lese.,j
Variable FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006
MilEmp -.435 .240 -.203(-.830) (.492) (-.391)
Bush2000 .003** .005*** .004***(2.586) (4.041 ) (3.238)
Party .034 -.006 -.006(.942) (-.167) (-.166)
South -.021 -.063' -.057(-.710) (-2.273) (-1.931)
Committee .052 .057 .022(1.543) (1.801 ) (.655)
under18 -.001 .000 .004(-.119) (-.095) (.806)
over64 .003 .003 .000(.571) (.697) (-.047)
Adj. R' 0.045 0.069 0.037
n 429 429 428
***indicates significance at the .001 level
** indicates significance at the .01 level
* indicates significance at the .05 level
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The first major result to note in Table 2, is that the
"MilEmp" variable is insignificant for each of the fiscal year
models. In fact, the variable is not even close to being significant,
with sig. values of .407, .623, and .696 for the years 2004-2006
respectively. This means that, after controlling for district
partisanship, member's party, region, and committee assignment,
dependency on military base employment has no effect on how a
district's Member votes on defense appropriations bills. While this
finding does not support the hypothesis, it does seem to support
most of Lindsay's and Cobb's findings in their previous research.
In their studies, Lindsay and Cobb both found little evidence of
military spending dependency having an effect on a Member's
vote on defense spending bills. When looking at the "MiIEmp"
variable in isolation, we might conclude, as they did, that the
failure to find a relationship in this study may be attributed to the
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fact that defense spending in one district can benefit citizens of the
surrounding districts. This would cause Members to support
defense spending bills even though the funds are not flowing
directly into their districts, consistent with Lindsay (1991). In this
case, it is possible that many of the jobs created by a military base
in one district are filled by citizens commuting in from a
neighboring district, creating a core of support for defense
spending bills outside of the district containing the base. In
addition, Cobb (1969) offers that the dependency on military
spending may not affect votes on defense spending bills because,
"A widespread belief in the importance of defense production to
the health of the economy helps ensure the acceptance of high
defense budgets." Whatever the reason, this result gives a very
early indication that the BRAC Commission's actions will not
have a political impact.
Although the "MilEmp" variable results tend to support the
findings of Cobb and Lindsay, the variable that is actually
influencing Members' votes differs here. In each of his studies,
Cobb found that most of the variance in voting was being
explained by the party and region of the Member (1969,1976). In
Table 2, however, we see that, contrary to his findings, the one
variable that shows up significant in every model is district
partisanship as measured by a district's vote for President Bush in
the 2000 election. While the low adjusted R2 values for each fiscal
year (.045, .069, and .037) tell us that district partisanship is not
explaining very much of the variance in Members' votes on
defense spending bills, the standardized beta values of .282, .235,
and .183, for fiscal years 2004-2006 respectively, are higher than
those for any other variable, telling us that the effect of district
partisanship is trumping that of military dependency and even
party and region.
Though the reason why district partisanship is affecting
Members' votes on defense spending bills over patty and region is
not apparent, this finding does offers an alternative explanation for
the insignificance of the "MilEmp" variable. It appears that rather
than allowing a specific constituency characteristic to influence
their votes, Members are voting based on their constituents'
ideological views as a whole. If a Member is disregarding
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constituency characteristics, military employment dependency will
not be significant. The effect of district partisanship here also
supports Erikson and Wright's position that, while, "The average
voter knows little about his or her representative... Elcctions bring
about much higher levcls of represcntation than most observcrs
would expcct based on thc low levels of citizen awareness"
(Erikson & Wright, 1997).
Conclusion
While the military-industrial complex theory suggests that
a dcpendency on military base employment effects how a
Congressman votes on defensc spending bills, the results of this
study show that such a specific constituency characteristic does not
influence voting. Instead, district partisanship or the overall
ideological views of a constitucncy play the biggest role in
dctcrmining how a Represcntative votes on defense spending
issues. The failure to find a relationship between defense spending
dependcncy and how a Representative votes on defense spending
bills gives us a vety early indication that the BRAC Commission's
basc realignmcnts and closures will not have political implications
in tcrms of reduccd support for defcnsc spending and it will be
interesting to see if future tcsts using spccific closure and voting
data play out thc same way.
More importantly, however, thc significance that was
found for district partisanship in defcnsc spending voting decisions
mcans that constituents' idcological views arc being manifested in
their Reprcsentatives' voting behaviors in Congress - more so than
thc constitucncy's charactcristics. It also means that, at lcast in
this case, despite the current powcr and cohesion of political
parties, they are having no bcaring on how a mcmber votes. Future
studies should cxplorc thc influencc of district partisanship
comparcd to party, region and constituency charactcristics in other
issue areas as well. By adding such findings to the conclusions
hcre, we would be able to see if district partisanship is now the
major playcr in all Congrcssional votes or if recent military
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